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By Truls Nygaard (From Wiwa R no. 2/85, article 22)
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Yes of course it was possible! 80 years ago in the fateful year of 1905 this was not such an unusual idea and if Norway had then been a richer country it is probable that the lake would have gotten its own mini-fleet, a squadron of gunboats. That is what the defense leaders at the time wanted. It was just too expensive in relation to the many other priorities that had to be addressed at the time. The demands had to be reduced to the arming of the civilian steamboats that already existed on the lake. Not even these plans were realized prior to the decisive break with Sweden, the Karlstad-agreement.
There was therefore no reaquaintence with the Viking era when ships were dragged across land to the great lakes where real sea battles were fought. The 'route over Eidet' between Lekumevja in Eidsberg to Mønster in Trøgstad was not renewed.
It was perhaps the tales in the sagas that inspired the plans for the 'lake-navy' at Øyeren. The plan was not just a flash in the pan, it had its roots in serious tactical considerations in the military's highest quarters, it was not new either. In 1836 when the development of a national defense was really a fact (in close cooperation with union partner Sweden) the idea was proposed, and not only for Øyeren but for Mjøsa as well. In 1836 the central Commission for Norway's Fortress Service was instituted. The commission's most important task was to propose locales for permanent fortresses and military depots, and it concluded that floating defense works should be built at both Øyeren and Mjøsa, with gunboat dinghies and boats (?) and fortified bases at Helgøya and Mørkfoss respectively.
The ships that were envisioned were probably the same type as those used so effectively in the coastal defense during the war from 1807-1814. They were open boats 16-20 meters in length that were either rowed or sail powered and armed with large caliber muzzle loaded weapons. The gunboat dinghies were of a very peculiar construction with a long aft end where the canons were placed. The crew numbered about 60. These types of ships offered a small target for enemy fire. They were relatively quick and easy to maneuver and almost totally independent of wind conditions so that with favorable circumstances they could go into a fight against far superior forces and emerge favorably from it.
On the lakes it was foreseen that they would be fighting ground forces that would be using lighter artillery. The gunboat dinghies would in this case be used as mobile afloat artillery. During the winter when the lakes were ice the dinghies would have to be placed near the bases. But a winter war inland was not seen as probable at that time.
The Central Commission of 1836 planned an extensive construction of fortresses both in the countryside and along the coast, amongst these was the Glomma line at Grønnsund and Onstadsund. It is worth noting that these facilities were designed to defend against attack from both the west and the east. This was because of the special strategy needed with respect to the close cooperation with Sweden, and in reality encompassed a common defense of the Scandinavian peninsula (something that also brought Mjøsa and Laagenvassdraget into the plans). Our thoughts go to 100 years later when - in 1940 - it would have been of great importance if the Glomma line's fortresses could have struck both east and west at this point!
Not many of the commission's proposals were accepted. Norway couldn't afford them. Besides it would be many years before war was a real possibility in our part of the world. The Commission's great achievement was that it showed the great need for a sea based defense of the capitol and how good the conditions were for just such a defense in Drøbak sound. On this point the Commission got a response. About 1850 the fortress Oscarsborg was built. Once again our thoughts go to 1940, to the great drama that unfolded in Drøbak sound on the morning of April 9th 1940 and which caused the necessary delay of the German Navy's schedule so that the king and government weren't captured - as per plan.
Military cooperation with Sweden was a matter of course for politicians and military authorities right up until just prior to the turn of the century. It was then that cracks in the union became pronounced. Other places in Europe also experienced heightened tensions and the shadow of war cast itself over many situations. In our brotherland Sweden there was already progress being made on a defense of Stockholm and it seemed like the right time for Norway - as a nation itself - to begin to prepare a defense of its capitol, Kristiania, not just from the sea where Oscarsborg already guarded the passage but from a land attack as well. A powerful attacker could go ashore in the south in Østfold (Smaalennene) or Vestfold and 'walk to Kristiania' it was maintained, or they could attack Sweden first with an amphibious assault on Baahuslen and later cross the border from the east at Fredrikshald, Ørje or Kongsvinger. And in the backs of their minds many thought that this was the way the Swedes would come if things between the two went really bad.
In the middle of the 1890s the dust from the old fortress plans were brushed away and new plans were worked out based on the changed circumstances such as road and rail bridges over the Glomma at Sarpsborg and Fossum. The Glomma line would be rearmed. In 1898 a series of strongholds - gun emplacements for the most part - from Greaaker to Fetsund on the west side of the river were built. These were prepared positions that would be manned by mobile forces as the situation required in case of war.
In this chain of fortresses the 25 km long line along Øyeren was of crucial importance. When the defenders had first taken what there was of boats on the lake it was seen as practically impossible for an attack force with a baggage train and artillery to force a crossing. At the same time the lake made an excellent connection between the Fossum division and Fetsund division. Armed ships could also disrupt or completely stop the attackers troop movements on the roads on the east side of the river.
On October 6th 1899 the general staff sent a query to the Navy's general staff, as it was called at hat time, to see if it was possible for the Navy to send some smaller warships to Øyeren (and Mjøsa - which was still part of the picture). The same month the navy answered that they did not have sufficient material so they could 'easily' transfer them to the lakes. Possibilities were 'Glommen' and 'Laugen', which could hardly be moved over land because of their size and weight. On the other hand gunboats of size class III - which were somewhat smaller - could be moved without too great a difficulty, but the ships were hardly worth the cost involved. The Navy's general staff submitted that the tugboats 'Glommen' and 'Øyeren' both about 40 tons, could be fitted with the same weapons as class III gunboats, 76mm rapid fire canons.
The other steamboats that sail Øyeren are small and useless with the possible exception of 'Strongmen' which weighs about 30 tons, and can possibly carry small cannons, it was said. Everything was stamped old if it had a speed of 8 knots. (Older gunboats could do no more than 7 knots). At Mjøsa the old 'Skibladner' at 100 tons was deemed to be very fit. For all of these ships it wasn't expected that they would be superior to covered land based artillery unless they had a great firepower superiority, there main objective was to stop infantry from getting to the shores. In these conditions it would be fairly easy for the shields on the cannons to be protected against small arms fire, it was said.
It was made quite clear that the Navy had no men to spare for these operations, they suffered from a lack of manpower as it was. Finally, in the letter from the Navy general staff they mentioned that the original crews from these vessels could be used for maneuvering while military personnel could man the weapons. There is reason to doubt how well this would have worked in a real war.
The general staff apparently accepted the Navy's recommendation ad notatum. In December 1899 the defense department requested that the Navy work out a proposal for the possible arming the above mentioned civilian boats. Things must have been happening fast at this time, possibly because of the political developments, because an answer was ready just after the New Year.
None other than Admiral Børresen, assisted by a captain, had inspected the boats. In the estimates the 'possible reimbursement to the owner of the boats for the inconvenience in personnel traffic which the placement of the reinforcements would necessarily bring' was not mentioned.
The report on Strømmen states that it was a propeller steamboat built in 1865 at 'Akers Mekaniske Verksted'. It could take 200 passengers. In addition it could take one Armstrong 76mm rapid-fire cannon on the forecastle, two on the command bridge and one similar 47-mm cannon aft. With deck reinforcement, construction of shields and the like it would cost 1500 crowns.
Glommen was a paddlewheel steamboat, built in 1874 at Nylands mekanisk verksted for the hauling of lumber (it was in use right up until after WWII !). It could hold 76-mm rapid fire cannons both fore and aft. In addition it could have 47-mm cannons on either side of the command bridge. This would cost 1700 crowns. Øyeren was the similar to Glommen, just 9 years older. It could handle the same changes. The arming would cost 1900 crowns because the boat had a windlass of wood, which would have to be replaced with a more modern, windlass that wasn't in the way of the bow cannons.
In addition Admiral BØrresen mentions some smaller boats on Øyeren: Rauma, a small propeller steamboat that could handle a 47-mm cannon on the bow, this was also the case with Gahn and Kikud. The boats Vulkan and Sofie were too small.
"If we are to get 'real' gunboats", as it is stated in the admirals letter, "they should of class II size." They could be made to go in shallows and at a speed of 8 knots. They could be armed with two 12 cm cannons with shields, four 76 mm cannons in the corners, and on the superstructure four 37 mm automatic cannons. These ships weighed 350 tons, had a draft of 2.8 meters. They would cost 7- 800 000 crowns each.
These numbers probably put an end to the last alternative. When the question of armed vessels came up in the fortress committee of 1899, where the well-known colonel Georg Stang sat and who later became defense minister with great influence over the committee's work (not the least when it concerned border fortresses), the case was given great weight, and the committee declared itself in agreement with the opinions which were relevant. But with the background of the extensive and expensive proposals, which the committee presented, on 'pure' fortress work it kept to the absolute necessary arming of Glommen and Øyeren with 37-mm rapid-fire cannons. The committee's proposals were for the most part accepted by the Storting and enacted, though not without debate and professional criticism, but they never got as far as the arming of the boats on Øyeren before the need passed in 1905.
Translated by Steven Mohn